This paper was presented in response to questions raised during a lecture that I gave on the topic of hermeneutics at Belhaven College, Jackson, MS.

In class I made the assertion that God, as He is revealed in Scripture, is the precondition necessary for all interpretation. I expressed this assertion in the form of a threefold revelational basis for hermeneutics. As a defense of this position I offered the following philosophic argument:

This defense may be called the impossibility of the contrary. Deny God and interpretation cannot account for its own intelligibility.

In response to this, a post-modern challenge was made that I was merely speaking within a “religious language game”. Behind this challenge was the counter-assertion that God is not the precondition necessary for all interpretation but rather:

1)    All metaphysics is merely a linguistic issue;

2)    Meaning is use (i.e. a construct of functions established by social convention).

My friend, I thank you for taking the time to discuss these matters with me. I’m sure you think I’m a bit obtuse in my claim that the Christ of Scripture is Lord over all creation and therefore must be acknowledged as such if science, philosophy, or interpretation are to have a leg to stand on. But please understand, if God is who He says He is (Sovereign, self-determined, immutable) then any lesser claim would not do. Such a God would be necessary for all thought. Of course I understand that you reject my claim. You maintain that metaphysics is simply a matter of linguistics and therefore all my talk of God is merely a religious language game with no bearing on anything outside of itself. Fair enough. However there is just one small matter that your system will have to overcome if it is to stand as a legitimate system. I maintain that God is necessary and that if you deny Him you cannot give an account of any experience you encounter in His world. Therefore, it will be incumbent upon your system to answer this challenge and show that it is able to get along very nicely without the Christ of Scripture. Let us see how it does.

First, we must note that for language to be defined as use, there must be a connection between language and the non-linguistic world. Otherwise, we cannot account for the functional nature of language, which you maintain is its essence. Unfortunately, your own system denies any such metaphysical coherence. On your own basis, metaphysics is simply a matter of wording. As such, your own system cannot even claim a cause and effect relation between language and the performance of a function or the response of a reader.

Next, language as use must assume a coherent community over time in order for the social functions of language to be defined, learned, and repeated. Also, there must be a continuity of personal identity for both speaker and hearer alike. Furthermore you must assume a coherence of objective factuality (If the command, “bring me a brick” is to have a definite social function, there must be a regularity of brick-ness corresponding to the use.) However, on your own basic assertions, all such metaphysical necessities are denied. Finally, your system cannot even account for the coherence of language itself. For you, language is an unexplained island of regularity adrift in a sea of chance.

But you will protest that certainly a thinker as great as Wittgenstein was aware of this problem. Indeed he was. Would you like to know his answer? He said that we have to start somewhere. We must assume the rules of the game or else digress into “shouting across the fence” at one another. In other words, I must assume the very principles I deny! Unfortunately, such reasoning is doomed.

In the end your system is its own self-refutation. But as a Christian I am not surprised. For you see Scripture does not claim that God is absolutely necessary only within a religious language game. Rather, it claims that God is necessary for all experience. Your system then far from denying God, actually provides a very powerful witness to God. For you have shown that to deny that which is absolutely necessary, will inevitably result in the impossibility of all that is dependent. By denying the Christ of the Scriptures, your system has self-destructed. But all is not lost. By its own futility, your system is itself a call to abandon such futility and honor the God to whom all life and experience are bound.

I have taken your system and your challenge seriously. However, on its own terms, we have seen your system vanish into the air. At the same time, in its faltering, your system has left us once more face to face with the God of creation and His claim on you His creature. I now ask you to listen to my system and allow me just a moment to share with you a Christ-centered hermeneutic.

Covenantal hermeneutics maintains two points that are central to our discussion. The first is that meaning is textual and definite. The second is that interpretation is actual and active. (That is, interpretation is not a clerical duty. Rather, it is the work of a unique individual together with his personal experiences.) The question then will be how Covenantal Hermeneutics can maintain both an active principle of interpretation and a definite textual meaning.

As we begin, we must establish the theocentric context in which both text and interpretation occur. This context may be described as the threefold revelational environment or basis of interpretation. In his article Force and Signification, Derrida maintains that finite man’s inability to grasp transcendence, especially transcendent Being (God) means that he can only know being by way of an infinite number of comparisons or differences. This endless play is in turn reflected by language. That is, the constant metaphysical play is reflected by the constant play of meaning within a text. The point here is twofold: (1) The relativity of Deconstruction’s version of reader-responsism is based on its atheos assumptions about God, the world, and man. (2) Covenantal Hermeneutics does not share these views (In fact, we have already demonstrated the unfortunate end of such views). Instead, Covenantal Hermeneutics begins with the threefold nature of revelation as the basis of interpretation.

The first aspect of this revelation is the world in which man lives. This world is governed by God’s sovereign plan. That is, God determines whatsoever comes to pass. There is nothing that falls outside His plan. Therefore, He is the source of all that is, was, or comes to pass. As such, the events and facts that man encounters are not the indefinite, unknowable, products of random chance. Instead, they are definite and meaningful objects of knowledge. The result is that God’s sovereignty over creation establishes a knowable reality, one that is not lost to endless possibility. However, one might argue that God’s sovereignty over creation offers no real help to man’s knowledge. In fact, if anything, it precludes the possibility of knowledge by placing its condition beyond man’s reach. Man is finite. Therefore, he cannot discover God’s thoughts and even if he could he is unable to know as God knows. Of course we agree that man cannot discover God’s thoughts or know them as God knows them. However, we deny that this precludes knowledge of creation for the very simple reason that God makes his thoughts about creation known to man in a sufficient and appropriate way. Scripture teaches that the facts and events of creation are not just governed by God’s plan but they are also a revelation of that plan in finite time and space. In other words, creation is a manifestation of the very plan that governs it. Thus, a fully known creation is made known to man on a finite level. As such, man is confronted with God’s thoughts about His creation at every turn. In other words, whenever man thinks about creation, he is thinking God’s thoughts after Him. God’s knowledge then is the basis or foundation that makes man’s knowledge possible. The result is that a sovereignly governed and revelatory creation (i.e. Natural Revelation) replaces unknowable contingency as the environment of interpretation.

The second aspect of revelation is Scripture. One might protest that the knowledge of any fact in a coherent system demands a transcendent knowledge of all the factors and relations that determine that fact. Otherwise, the basis of this knowledge will be lost to an infinite deferral. That is, the knowledge of any one fact will always require the knowledge of some other fact as its foundation (and so on to infinity). Therefore, it is not enough that man encounters God’s thoughts about creation. He must share God’s absolute, transcendent, perspective of creation. In other words, man must comprehend God’s plan along with God. However, for finite man such a transcendent, absolute perspective is not possible. Of course we agree that without an absolute perspective of a coherent system, knowledge will have no basis upon which to stand. We also agree that such an absolute comprehension is not possible for finite man. However, we deny that this precludes man’s knowledge of creation for the very simple reason that in place of finite man’s need to comprehend transcendence is God’s absolute perspective revealed in Scripture. Because man is not the source of this perspective, it is not necessary that he comprehend it or reality exhaustively. Rather he receives this perspective on the basis of authority from the one who does comprehend exhaustively. Therefore, the perspective necessary for right understanding is apprehended sufficiently, rather than comprehended exhaustively, by man. Likewise, because God’s knowledge is that which forms and directs all the facts and events of creation, God’s word speaks with absolute authority and certainty to His world. Scripture then is God’s authoritative word about His creation in terms of which man is to base his understanding of all experience.

Finally, the third aspect of revelation is man as God’s image. As God’s image, man’s mind is not cut off from meaning or existence as God determines them. Instead, man’s mind is formed by the same sovereign plan that formed creation. Therefore, both the objects of knowledge as well as the mind that knows these objects have a single determinant source. The result is a fundamental coherence or agreement between the interpreter and the interpreted. Man was created to know creation. Furthermore, because God creates the very processes of man’s mind, the activity of man’s thought cannot be the original or determinant source of reality’s structure. That is, man’s mind is never its own independent or self-sufficient point of reference. Rather, at every point, whether from within or from without, man’s knowledge is derivative of and dependent on God’s knowledge. As such, man cannot help but think God’s thoughts after him. However, because man is fallen, his mind distorts this knowledge. Therefore, Salvific Revelation (or regeneration) is necessary to restore man’s image, and thus his mind.

The significance of the above for our present discussion is that the environment of interpretation is one of fundamental coherence. The author, text, reader, and world all stand in relation to God and His plan. Therefore, no one of these is ultimately alien to or unknowable by the others. Instead, each is maintained in its full integrity throughout the interpretation process (a text will disclose the author’s intended meaning about an identifiable subject to a reader who is able to understand it).

Please note that at this point we have not distinguished between the believer and the unbeliever concerning their relationship to the basis of interpretation. For now it will do simply to note that while the unbeliever does not acknowledge God or his dependence on God, he cannot escape being God’s creature in God’s world. Therefore, unbelief does not negate the actuality of the basis. Instead, it precludes the unbeliever’s ability to give a viable account of that basis.

That said, it will now do to demonstrate something of the manner in which the reader is said to respond to the text yet without denying meaning as definite and textual.

1)    To answer how fidelity and response work together, we must begin with the text. The text is volitional. That is, the text is a register of choices, selections and arrangements by which the work is composed. It is through these decisions that the context, the author’s intentions, and his subject matter enter the text. As such, these matters are not to be sought below, beyond, or beneath the text. Rather they are factors fundamental to the very formation of the text, and therefore, are disclosed by it. Thus, the text is not cut off from reality. At the same time, these decisions are themselves acts of interpretation. That is, they establish the meaning of the text. The author selects and arranges the particulars of his composition. His choices are based upon his purpose and understanding. Thus, meaning directs composition and composition in turn discloses meaning. The result is a self-sufficient text able to communicate an intended meaning about an identifiable subject matter. As such, the text is the focus of interpretation. Meaning is textual.

2)    Next, we must turn to consider the interpreter. The interpreter is a unique individual who comes to the text from a distinct culture, place, and time. Furthermore, he comes in the midst of specific situations, with a distinct personality and a lifetime of experiences. However, these factors that make up the uniqueness of the interpreter are no less a part of God’s sovereign plan than the author, text, or world he seeks to interpret. As such, the interpreter is not cut off or isolated from the interpreted. Instead, the common relationship of all particulars to God and His plan establishes the correspondence and communicability within existence. This point cannot be over emphasized. God’s sovereignty maintains both the unity and diversity of individuals, cultures, and experiences. Therefore, actual diversity is not lost to uniformity. At the same time, actual unity (and thus the correspondence between distinct particulars) is not lost to disparity. The result then is that far from being a detriment to interpretation or textual meaning, the particularity of the interpreter is actually an essential precondition of interpretation. In fact a neutral reading would by necessity preclude all but a formal textual meaning. In such a case, the text would speak to no one about nothing. There would be no surface, so to speak, upon which the text could register its mark. If communication is to be more than a formal ideal, interpretation must be personal and active. Meaning must speak to the reader (i.e. to his personal experiences) otherwise it will be unintelligible gibberish, not to mention completely irrelevant. It is the reader’s ability to grasp the text in terms of his own experiences that provides the bridge between the reader and the text. In other words, both understanding and relevance demand the activity of the reader.

3)    Let us now consider the interaction between the interpreter and the text. If meaning is textual and if the experiences of the reader are required for this meaning to be grasped, then the process of interpretation will involve an existential exploration guided by the relations of the text. As the interpreter reads, certain of his experiences, emotions, thoughts, and associations are called forth by the text while others are dissuaded. Those that are called forth are then explored for their potential ability to explain the details and relations of the text. That is, the experiences called forth by the text are explored in terms of the text. The result is that these experiences are modified, refined, and arranged by the text after its own likeness. The reader is thus thinking, feeling and experiencing along with the text. Interpretation then utilizes the reader’s life experiences to understand the text, while, at the same time, these very experiences enter the matrix of the text and are shaped by it. In the end, interpretation produces a union between the reader and the text, a seeing-as, that neither excludes the actuality of the seeing or the otherness of the vision. Take for example the following Haiku poem by Basho:   

Here on the mountain pass

                              Somehow they draw one’s heart so-

                              Violets in the grass

As one reads, his own experience of violets is called forth (or called upon) to help him understand the meaning of the poem. As such, his experience is not simply imposed upon the text nor does it replace or become the text. Instead, the interpreter’s experience is subjected to the relations of the text. In this case, the interpreter’s experience of violets will be explored in terms of its relationship to mountains and grass in order to understand the flower’s possible draw on the heart. Thus, as the reader’s experience enters the arrangement of the poem, the delicate, transient, smallness of the flower is seen against the solidity, permanence, and grandeur of the mountain. Likewise the striking purple of the violet is contrasted to the common green of the trees and grass all around it. The exploration continues. The flower is then related to the traveler, who is also only passing through. As such, the interpreter’s experiences of violets and mountain passes are called forth, refined and given a particular significance by the relations of the text. Had the interpreter never seen a violet or walked a mountain pass his interpretation would require a direct exploration rather than one by memory. Regardless, in both cases, interpretation is an existential exploration directed by the textual relations. Thus, for our purposes, the union between the reader and the text (“seeing as”) may just as easily be called “responding as”, a responding that neither denies the actuality or the otherness of the response. In the end, interpretation is active but not open-ended.

[Note: in the case where direct experience is not possible, one may resort to reference works or commentaries for a secondhand experience. However such is always less desirable than personal experience. It should also be noted that novel meanings are made possible by the relational nature of language and text. When the author wishes to communicate something exotic or esoteric (something, which he fully expects his reader not to have experienced), he is able to do so successfully by relating it to, or describing it in terms of, something that is well known. Thus a text is able to provide new information.]

4)    So far, Covenantal Hermeneutics has demonstrated the activity of the reader as well as the integrity of textual meaning. Now we must account for the possibility of diverse readings for a single text that nonetheless remain faithful to the text. The question then before us is how definite textual meaning can be maintained in the face of a plurality of seemingly legitimate interpretations. First, it should be noted that much of the confusion over this issue stems from a misconception of the nature of textual meaning. For example, by maintaining a definite textual meaning, we are not proposing the traditional view that every text has but “one meaning”. Such a view reduces meaning to an abstract generic proposition and the text to a series of inconsequential particulars that may be disposed of once the meaning is extracted. As such meaning is cut off from the details, organic relations, and developments of the text by which it is disclosed and by which it in turn discloses reality. At the same time, the details of the work are stripped of their significance and seen only in terms of the oneness of meaning. In the final analysis, this view cuts interpretation off from the text and the text off from reality. The result is a flat anemic meaning that can never account for the text and is always far less than what the text offers. Consider the following:

In calling for one meaning do we really suppose that the entire play Macbeth can be reduced to the likes of: “Over ambition is hurtful.” Or maybe, we suppose there is but one meaning per act, speech, or section of the text. Thus the soliloquy in Act V, Scene V (“Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow…”) is little more than a long-winded way of saying “life is meaningless” – but what of the insights into the brevity and redundancy of life provided by this section of text? To say life is meaningless is not the same thing as saying it is brief and redundant. Rather, these several factors combine to provide a multifaceted picture of life. However, by insisting that this section has only one meaning, we have ignored a great portion of the wealth that this picture provides.

Or maybe our position is that there is but one meaning per sentence. Yet even here our model fails to account for the text. In Act I, Scene IV, when King Duncan says, “in his commendations I am fed; it is a banquet for me” does he mean that Macbeth’s valor nourishes him? Or does he mean that Macbeth has left to prepare a feast in his honor? It is both. In fact, the power of this line is the way that it places both images side by side in such a way that their distinction is not lost and yet in such a way that they combine to mutually disclose the richness of this portion of the text. Thus Macbeth’s valor is seen in terms of a feast. Not only does it sustain the king like a meal, but it is also a joy and a sharing among friends. At the same time, the feast is seen in terms of valor. Therefore, it too takes on new significance. By way of its relation to valor, the banquet becomes the embodiment of the very benefits and blessings it celebrates.

In the end, the view that every text has but one meaning must be rejected as insufficient and unfaithful to the text. In the first place, it requires each interpreter to grasp the whole of the text exhaustively or else fail to grasp it at all. Not only that but it requires all interpreters to grasp the text in exactly the same way. Understanding then will always be generic. As such, the ability of the text to speak meaningfully to a dynamic and personal existence is denied. A generic meaning will only carry a generic relevance. Furthermore, by distorting the nature of textual meaning, this view promotes a false goal and a false measure for the process of interpretation. As such, it misleads interpretation and encumbers a faithful understanding of the text. Therefore, if we are going to maintain a textual meaning that is more than anemic and at the same time provide an account of diverse but faithful readings, we are going to have to clarify our understanding of textual meaning and it’s relation to the reader and the world.

5)    How then do we maintain a definite textual meaning in the face of diverse interpretation? First, we must push the matter back to its theocentric context. For it is the theocentric context of interpretation that establishes both the complexity of textual meaning as well as the potential for diverse but faithful understandings of a single work.

The Theocentric Context of Interpretation

The theocentric orientation of all reality establishes the context in which the text is both formed and interpreted. This orientation includes the world about which the text is written, the author who writes the text (together with all his experiences), and the interpreter who reads the text (again with all his experiences). This orientation may be diagrammed in terms of a primary vertical relation and a derivative horizontal plain of relations.

The Subject Matter of a Text

Every detail of existence stands in a determinant relation to God and in a derivative relation to the other aspects of God’s plan. As such, the theocentric orientation of reality establishes the complexity of the subject matter. Creation is relational and therefore complex. At the same time, the theocentric orientation of reality demarcates the nature of this complexity. Because every detail of existence, together with all its relations, is established by God’s plan, complexity is not the result of random chance. Furthermore, the complex relations that describe reality are not the original products of man’s mind. Therefore, complexity does not reduce knowledge to a relative and endless play of difference. Instead, complexity is objective and knowable. The theocentric orientation of reality then both establishes and defines the nature of complexity. In turn, this complexity allows for diverse perspectives and understandings of a subject that nonetheless remain identifiable with and accountable to that subject.

The Author as interpreter

A complex factuality requires a complex interpreter; one who will be able to encounter his subject in its various nuances, relations, and implications. Because the author is himself a part of the theocentric creation, he too is complex and therefore able to engage the complexity of his subject in a meaningful way. That is, his encounter with a subject is not reduced to a flat, generic, experience. Rather he is able to engage, and thus disclose, his subject on several levels and from many different angles. The bottom line is that a complex author and a complex subject matter provide for a potentially complex understanding.

The Text

Next, it follows that a complex understanding will require a text able to communicate the various nuances, relations, and associations of that understanding. However, one might argue that the very issue at hand is the inability of the text to adequately convey the complexity of relations that is required to disclose a subject. To this we must respond by asking our critic what conditions would have to be met in order for a text to be able to adequately communicate a definite meaning. The answer we receive is that the text must exhaustively or comprehensively convey a subject, together with all its factors, or else the text will be left open to an infinite number of uncertainties and potential relations. In other words, without a comprehensive disclosure, textual meaning will fall victim to an endless play of possibilities. The result is that by saying something, I inevitable say any and everything and therefore, I say nothing in particular. Of course, we deny this demand for exhaustive comprehension as well as the claim of textual insufficiency. An open text is the product of an open universe not a theocentrically oriented and sovereignly governed creation. At no point does man’s knowledge ever rest on his own total comprehension of a matter. Rather, it is at every point dependent on God’s absolute perspective and His self-determined disclosure. Thus, at once, man’s knowledge is that of derivation and apprehension, not originality and comprehension. Second, even on a finite level, man does not consider every aspect or every detail of a subject and its context. Rather, interpretation is by nature selective. In other words, interpretation is the perception of those details and relations that illuminate a subject. As such the selective nature of textual disclosure does not preclude understanding, it mirrors it.

Furthermore, we must be careful not to draw an absolute distinction between the author’s act of interpreting and his act of composing. First, thinking is not merely a succession of random mental sensations. Instead it is a conscious act of organizing, connecting and arranging various particulars. As such, thought is a composition of sorts. On the other hand, composition is not something that occurs after or independently of understanding. Rather composition is itself a process of thought. That is, the choices and decisions made during composition serve to clarify, connect, and organize understanding. As such, composition is both a process of forming understanding as well as the process by which understanding is given form (becomes an objective work or text). It follows then that composition is itself a type of thinking while thinking (or interpreting) is a type of composing. Second, the fundamental nature of both understanding and composition is that of details in relation. Interpretation is the perception of pertinent details and significant relations while disclosure is the selection and arrangement of these for the purpose of conveying understanding. In the end, understanding and text cannot be separated in an absolute manner. The complexity of the text not only conveys the complexity of understanding, but it also arises from it. The text then is a complex of particulars that are selected and arranged to disclose a definite, intended, and identifiable understanding of a definite identifiable subject.

Next we should note that the complexity of a text, together with the theocentric orientation of reality establishes the ability of a text to speak across time and place. Because all time and place stand related to God, they stand in a derivative relation to one another. Therefore coherence is not lost to the actuality of diversity. Nor must diversity be reduced to uniformity. Instead, the very relational nature at the heart of creation also serves as the foundation of textual relevance. A distinct textual meaning speaks to a dynamic and diverse existence by way of likeness. The text calls forth experiences of the reader, which are like those in the text. The result is that meaning is grasped in terms of things familiar to the reader. As such, meaning is at once relevant and at the same time textual. On the other hand, likeness is not sameness. Instead, the text confronts the reader with difference, distance, and otherness. It says something new, something similar to but different than the reader’s own experiences. It is because of this difference that the text is able to inform the reader. The unexpected or novelty presented by the text forces the reader either to continue reading in confusion or to adjust his prior notions, bringing them in line with those of the text. The result is a seeing as whereby the text transforms the reader’s experience into its own likeness. In the end, it is this similar-dissimilar dynamic of likeness that allows the text to be both informative as well as relevant. Our point here is simply to note that the complexity of the text allows for a diversity of relations into which it may enter, while the theocentric orientation of reality extends this potential over time and place.

Before we continue there is one central question that our view of textual meaning must address. If textual meaning is complex, how is the text able to speak precisely about a single matter? In other words, by denying that every text has but one meaning, have we not also precluded specific or simple meanings?

First, by denying that a text has but one meaning, we are not precluding the potential for specific or simple meanings. Nor is it enough to say that by disputing the one meaning view, we are merely denying that all texts must have one and only one meaning. If such were the case our position could be summarized by saying that while some texts have simple meanings, others have more complex meanings. Therefore, neither simplicity nor complexity may be ruled out by default. Now while I agree that neither simplicity nor complexity may be ruled out, I believe the above summary misses a crucial point of our argument. Furthermore, it leaves the determinant open-ended so that any disagreement over meaning may be attributed to a multiple meaning, regardless of whether such is the case. Our point was not to prescribe the number of things a text can say but rather to dispute the very nature of textual meaning itself, regardless of whether that meaning is multiple or simple. In other words, our purpose was to dispute the non-relational and atomistic notion of textual meaning behind the one meaning view of a text. Basic to our position is the view that text and language alike are inherently relational and therefore complex in nature. As such, we do not preclude simple or specific meanings rather we deny that their nature is isolated and abstract. The result of this textual complexity then is not the exclusion of precision but rather a textual versatility that under-girds all such precision. This textual versatility follows from the theocentric orientation of a text’s origin.

Because the particularity of a subject is no less established by God’s plan than the complexity of its relations, particularity is not lost to complexity regarding either reality or the disclosure of reality. In fact, the one is unintelligible without the other. Particularity is never known in utter isolation while coherence is always the coherence of particulars. Thus, language is able to reflect the emphasis of the author’s focus within this balance. For example, we would say that the sentence, “He brought me a book”, has a simple or single meaning. However, upon closer inspection we find that our sentence also displays an inherent complexity common to text and meaning alike. It is this complexity that provides the text its potential to enter the various relations presented by a context. In other words, because a text is relational by nature, even when its meaning is simple, it is able to adapt to the demands of various contexts with precision. Complexity then is the prerequisite for simplicity and specificity. Therefore, we must not be deceived by the abstract quality of our example. As it stands, the meaning of our sentence is anything but simple. “He brought me a book” may mean, “He brought me a book” (that is, he brought it to me and not to someone else). It may mean, “He brought me a book” (and not a cup or pencil). It may mean, “He brought me a book” (instead of mailing it). Apart from a defining context our sentence displays its complexity in a wide range of potential meanings. It is only by virtue of its relation to a context that the meaning is made simple and precise. Thus, the complexity of textual meaning does not preclude simple or specific meanings rather it establishes them. In fact, as our example has shown, it is precisely because the nature of textual meaning is complex that it can be molded and fitted exactly to its context. Unlike the one meaning view, simple meanings presuppose, rather than deny, the complexity of textual relations.

The Reader as interpreter

A complex text requires a complex reader, who will be able to encounter the various nuances, relations, and implications of the text. Because the reader is himself a part of the theocentric creation, he too is complex in his relations and experiences. Therefore he is able to engage the complexities of the text in a meaningful way. Now already we have seen how the reader’s various experiences provide for an active or actual principle of interpretation. Here the complexity of the reader combines with his activity to provide a diversity of experiences and associations by which the text may be engaged. Because the individual interpreter is actual and necessary to the process of interpretation these various experiences will result in an encounter with the text that is unique. That is, the experiences and associations by which each reader relates to the text and in terms of which his understanding of the text is expressed will vary. However because these experiences are called forth and shaped by the text they are relevant and kindred to the text. As such, there is a diversity of approaches, insights, and associations that nonetheless remain faithful to the text and coherent with one another. For example, let us say that you and I and one other were reading Catullus' poem Odi Et Amo

                              I hate and love. You may ask me why? But

                              it beats me. I feel it done to me and ache.

In order to help us understand this poem, we each draw on our past experiences of love. I begin by saying that I once loved a girl but when she left me, I grew to despise her. Therefore, I understand the poem to be about the passion and anger of rejected love. However, both you and our friend point out that my understanding fails to take into account the relations of the text. First the poet does not love then hate. Rather he does both at once. Love and hate seem to combine into one feeling. In fact he says he “I feel it done to me”. Likewise, his love/hate seems directed to a single person (thus the instantaneous nature of these two diverse emotions). You then add that I have merely used a loose association with a few elements of the poem to expound on my own interests. In fact, you claim that my interpretation is a perfect example of a reader response hermeneutic- sloppy exegesis excused by a narcissistic theory of interpretation. At this point, our friend, who can bear no more of my inept reading, draws upon his experiences of love. In doing so, he identifies with the longing of being in love called forth by the poem. In turn, the poem shapes his understanding of that longing providing it with the new sense of anguish and cruelty. Thus he understands the poem to be about the intense passion of love. After listening to his interpretation I see the poem’s insight into the way love is both a joy and a torment at once. You, on the other hand, identify with the way love is not to be resisted in the poem. For you, the poem calls forth the memory of helplessness in the face of love. In turn, the poem provides this memory with a new significance. Love is something “done” to you, something that “beats” you so you can not help but return it. Thus, you maintain that the poem is about the otherness and power of love. After listening to your interpretation I come to see the poem’s insight into love as something that has a life of its own.

The point here is simply to demonstrate the way that the complexity of the reader, together with the complexity of the text, provides for a diversity of interpretations that are nonetheless accountable to the text. In other words, diversity does not by necessity mean disparity. The reader is complex and unique. Therefore, the interpretation of a complex text will potentially be diverse.

Telos as measure

Finally, we must add that the telos of interpretation as well as the definite textual meaning provide the leveling ground for the diversity of interpretation. Regardless of how numerous or diverse the experiences and associations brought to the text may be, they all serve one end: to understand what the text means. This telos reflects the confidence and expectation that the reader has concerning a text. Because the author, text, reader, and world all stand in relation to God and His plan, no one of these is ultimately alien to or unknowable by the others. Instead, each is maintained in its full integrity throughout the interpretation process. Therefore, the reader is right to expect a text to communicate the author’s intended meaning about a definite and identifiable subject matter. As such, the interpreter’s activity, however diverse, must give an account of the text. Of course, disputes and disagreements will arise. At points these will be over mutually exclusive readings of a single text. Other times the disagreement will only be apparent. Regardless, the issue is always the meaning of the text and therefore the text is the final arbitrator and judge of interpretation.

Summary

1)    The theocentric orientation of all reality establishes the correspondence between the author, text, reader, and world. As such, this orientation provides the basis for interpretation.

2)    Meaning is textual. It is not located behind, beneath, or beyond the text. Instead, the text is a register of choices, selections, and arrangements that communicate an intended meaning about an identifiable subject.

3)    The reader is an actual interpreter whose unique experiences are active throughout the interpretation process. Without such personal engagement, textual meaning remains unintelligible and irrelevant. Therefore, the goal of interpretation is faithfulness, not neutrality.

4)    Textual meaning is not compromised by the reader’s activity. Rather, the text calls forth certain of the reader’s experiences while dissuading others. In turn, these experiences are shaped by the text after its own likeness. Thus interpretation is a “seeing as” that maintains both the actuality and the otherness of the vision. In the end, the success (faithfulness) of an interpretation is measured by its ability to give an account of the details and relations of the text.

5)    The theocentric orientation of reality establishes the complexity of the author, text reader, and world. Each is related to God as well as to the other particulars of God’s plan. This complexity then leads us to reject the notion that a text must have one and only one meaning. In place of this view is the position that textual meaning is both definite and relational and therefore complex.

6)    The complexity of textual meaning does not preclude simple or specific meanings rather it establishes them. In fact, it is precisely because the nature of textual meaning is complex that it can be molded and fitted exactly to its context.

7)    The complexity of the theocentric orientation of reality, together with the uniqueness and actuality of the interpreter, provides for diverse interpretations that nonetheless remain faithful to the text. This diversity of interpretation underscores the ability of a text to speak meaningfully to a dynamic and multifaceted existence.

At last it is time to bring our discussion to a close. I hope our visit together has shed some light on the absolute necessity of God for interpretation. I trust that upon reflection you will recognize that I have not simply posited a concept of god as a limiting notion in order to answer the demands faced by interpretation. That is, I have not merely come to a problem and then offered blind faith in a god as the solution. Rather, I started with the self-revelation of the God of Scripture as the basic point of reference. From there I have attempted to provide a faithful account of interpretation in light of its relationship to this specific God. At every point our discussion has sought to demonstrate its dependence on God. Likewise we have also sought to demonstrate the devastating effect on interpretation when THIS GOD is denied. However, what we have here is merely a beginning (and a scant one at that). It still remains to be shown how this basis of interpretation informs the actual practice of interpretation. For this we will need to turn to Scripture and the method it reveals. Unfortunately, such is beyond the scope of our present endeavor. For now let it suffice to say that while the theocentric orientation of creation establishes the possibility of interpretation, Scripture’s method (the Method of Kinds) directs the practice of interpretation in light of this basis.