Dear Calvin,

 

Your dad asked me to write down a few reflections for you of the philosophical persuasion. However, before I begin let me just say how impressed I am with both your grasp of the basic ideas that we will cover here as well as your desire to share your faith. I can't wait to see how God will use you in His Kingdom work. I only wish I had been as far along at the age of 19 as you are now. Thank you for your friendship and the kindness you have shown both me and my family. It has truly meant a lot.

 

 

Your brother in the journey,           

 Charlie Carlberg (April 2006)

 

 

I. Achilles and his Heal

 

1] Behind every fallen system of hermeneutics there are basic assumptions about God, the world, and man. These basic assumptions will ultimately determine both the issues a system addresses as well as the solutions it attempts to provide.

About God: Fallen hermeneutics denies that God is self-determined, immutable and sovereign. As such, it denies God's absolute necessity for both reality and the understanding of reality. Therefore, whether or not God actually exists is not methodologically essential to interpretation. Interpretation then is neither dependent on nor obligated to God.

About Word: The world is not directed by God's sovereign plan. As such its basic governing principle is that of impersonal freedom. Regardless of whether chance or rationalism is held supreme, God is not the determinant point of reference, which directs reality according to His purpose. Thus, it follows that God's word about creation is not necessary to understand creation. Reality then is its own final point of reference.

About Man: Man, like the world around him, is independent of God. In both his ability and activity as an interpreter, man is in no way dependent on or obligated to God. With no outside point of reference necessary for understanding, man is a self-sufficient interpreter.

Critique: In the end, fallen hermeneutics maintains a wholly immanent basis of interpretation. However, such a basis fails to explain even the possibility of interpretation. The principle of impersonal freedom will result in a universe that is either governed by ultimate chance or by an ultimate rationalism. Ultimate chance results in chaos and therefore precludes the coherence of either fact or the interpreter of facts. Ultimate rationalism results in an interconnected, deterministic, system where particularity is lost to absolute oneness. Regardless in both cases volition, individuality and knowledge are unintelligible. (It should be noted that, in practice, every fallen system assumes both a principle of chance and a principle of coherence. On the one hand, a view that is rationalistic will covertly maintain a principle of freedom and individuality. On the other hand, a view that is based on the ultimate freedom of facts will covertly maintain a system of coherence or laws that relate those facts to one another. The problem of course is the inability of such systems to explain the coexistence of these mutually exclusive principles given its own basic presuppositions.) In the end, fallen hermeneutics will result in subjectivism, relativism and skepticism. As such fallen hermeneutics may be described as the Hermeneutics of Despair.

 

2] Fallen hermeneutics as the Hermeneutics of Despair.

 

(a) The essence of despair is fallen man's inability to escape what he cannot obtain.

(1)  Man cannot escape being God's creature in God's world. Everywhere he turns God's relation to creation defines and determines all other relations (man's relation to the world, himself and others). This inescapability may be defined as obligation.

(2)  However fallen man has lost fellowship with God. As such he will not, nor can he, partake of the single relation definitive of all that confronts him (be it from within or from without). This loss of fellowship may be defined as judgment.

(3)  The governing principle then of fallen hermeneutics is alienation from all relations and the inescapability of judgment.

 

(b) The Hermeneutics of Despair has three characteristics

(1)  Self-deception- this is man's attempt to redefine his relations on a surrogate (false) basis. This is the despair of idolatry.

(2)  Despondency- this is the underlying awareness (whether it is acknowledged or not) of the futility of all such idols.

(3)  Remorse- this is the Christian living in terms of false relations.

 

3] Assessment of fallen interpretation: If fallen interpretation denies the preconditions necessary for interpretation, how then do we account for its ability to seemingly provide understanding of many aspects of creation?

(a)   First, we must be careful not to assume a fallen standard of knowledge as our measure. Likewise, because the believer is not yet perfected, his knowledge cannot serve as an adequate measure. Instead we must hold Scripture's assessment as our final measure.

(b)  Second, in order to be consistent with Scriptures assessment, it will help to think of the knowledge that fallen interpretation yields as a parody or caricature of the knowledge that God intends. Imagine that you have a photo of a person and beside it you have a caricature of the same person. You can tell by looking at the two that they are of the same person. There is a correspondence between them. So too is there a correspondence between fallen knowledge and intended knowledge. This is because man cannot escape being God's creature in God's world. However if you place the caricature over the photo you will notice that at no point do the lines agree; so too with fallen knowledge. At no point will it finally agree with intended knowledge. [Remember God's plan and purpose are not imposed upon a brute factuality. Rather, they are formative and intrinsic to the facts at every level of consideration. Therefore, to deny God does not simply impair the extent of knowledge but rather it distorts knowledge at every point. Also remember that not all knowledge is distorted in the same way or to the same extent. Instead it is a departure by degrees.] In the end, what is said of fallen virtue may be applied to fallen knowledge. When fallen man is considered in relation to other men, he may be called virtuous. However, his virtue is relative to that of man. When compared to God and God's standard, there is none good, not one. In the same way, man may be said to know truth. However, once again the assessment is relative. When compared to the knowledge that God intends for man, we must say that the mind is darkened and the truth is spiritually discerned.

 

 

II. The Bow of Paris

As you get down to doing apologetics, as you assess an unbeliever's system, begin by listening for the contradiction it makes in the area of the one and the many. This may be expressed in terms of law and freedom, reason and particularity, chance and coherence. Regardless, every fallen system assumes both a principle of particularity (chance) and a principle of coherence (law/reason). The problem of course is the inability of such systems to explain the coexistence of these mutually exclusive principles once they have denied the Triune God of Scripture, in whom the one and many eternally cohere. For example, evolutionists claim that the big bang and all subsequent development occurred by chance. They of course base their theory on statistics and experimental observation (i.e. laws, regularity, and coherence). The problem for them comes when they try to explain what relevance statistics, scientific laws, and observations have in relation to a chance driven factuality. Science maintains freedom of particularity while covertly assuming the coherence of laws.

 

One final point: most people you talk with will be very unsophisticated in their thoughts. They will bounce back and forth from claims about what we know (i.e. metaphysics, the nature of reality, what is) to how we know (i.e. Epistemology, claims about the mind, and consciousness). Listen for the shifts and hold them to the point at hand. I found it helpful to stop them and say something like, "Hold on a second, just a moment ago you said we can't know anything for certain. When I gave you a response to that claim you changed directions and said that reality is all random chance. Those two points are radically different. One deals with our mind and how we know, the other deals with reality and what we know. Now I am glad to talk to you about the nature of reality and what we know but before we go on, I made a point about your last objection concerning our inability to know anything for certain. You have still not answered me. Are you willing to concede that point to me? If so then we will move on. If not then you need to answer my critique."

 

 

III. Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Derrida

Your dad asked me to give you a brief critique of each of these thinkers. Before I do let me encourage you to do more than just refute unbelieving systems. After a while that gets to be old hat. What is far more important is the ability to follow the thoughts of a great thinker and rethink them in a scripturally consistent manner (Wittgenstein had a lot to say about language as use. What does use look like in a theocentric context?). Such then not only tears down the idol and answers the critic but it is also faithful to bring God's word to bear on creation in a constructive manner. Notice then our threefold project: first, we demolish the idol. Second, we subdue the thought under obedience to Christ. Third, we bring forth the refined and theocentric insight to the glory of God and the betterment of His people. The result is that we can answer the unbeliever on His own term and at the same time show him a better way. That is, we can show him what his ideas look like when they are redeemed by Christ. Consider the following two verses:

 

Corinthians 10:5 We are destroying speculations and every lofty thing raised up against the knowledge of God, and we are taking every thought captive to the obedience of Christ,

Ecclesiastes 2:26 For to a person who is good in His sight He has given wisdom and knowledge and joy, while to the sinner He has given the task of gathering and collecting so that he may give to one who is good in God's sight.

 

 

Heidegger

Heidegger looks at the history of metaphysics and sees it falsified by a theological/platonic dualism. This dualism separates the world of Being from that of beings. For example, Being is stable while beings are unstable and subject to endless change. Being is rational (mind/reason) while beings are irrational (body/passions/ emotions).The result is that our quest to understand Being is always distorted. Being is always defined in terms of its opposition to beings. Heaven is above the earth. Mind is over body. Form is truer than matter. Eternal life is superior to temporal life. By casting Being up and beyond this world into the ethereal realms, man has lost his ability to discover anything of use about Being. For Heidegger then this platonic and theological dualism compromises the task of metaphysics from the onset. Philosophy has failed to adequately define what is, because it has started with the wrong picture of the world.

 

In his major work, Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to recover the question of Being by doing away with philosophy's metaphysical dualism. To do this Heidegger undertakes a revision of the philosophical method or approach to the question of Being.

 

1. Being is not an ideal or a god. It is the Being or essence of all that is (Being is the Being of beings)
2. To understand this Being, Heidegger proposes that we start with man since man shares in Being like the rest of what is. However, unlike rocks and cabbage, man is aware of and can reflect upon his own being.
3. Heidegger then brackets out all theological and theoretical considerations of Being and instead seeks to discover Being through man's reflection on his own existence (thus the name Existentialism). It is through man's self-understanding as a being that the way is opened to understanding Being in general.
4. In order to undertake this exploration of the self, Heidegger must first clear the path of all that falsifies man's self-awareness. To do so, Heidegger points to several pitfalls that lead to an inauthentic self-understanding and thus obscure the way to Being.
• First man is "thrown into the world". He is not here by any design or for any purpose. As such, man's being is at once a "being in the world" and at the same time is free from the world (i.e. free from any obligation or greater good that is often imposed upon man). However, man's encounter with otherness and the pressure to conform to others distorts man as a true self. This conformity inevitably obscures the integrity of man's self-reflection and thus hinders the discovery of the essence of Being. According to Heidegger then, man must seek to live "authentically" (true to self and not others). It is only when man is truly himself that he can undertake the quest for Being honestly. For Heidegger our moods are signposts or articulations of the true self. As such they provide an important guide to rediscovering the authentic self. For example, the last time I preached, you may have been bored. This boredom reflects your true self and its true relationship to the situation (world around you). By politely sitting there, you acted contrary to yourself and thus denied yourself the potential of discovering your own being. Heidegger would have you stand up and walk out. In doing so you would have taken a small step in breaking free from others and in clearing the way for true discovery.
• The second obstacle to authenticity that Heidegger wishes to remove is the desire for permanence and stability. Man wants a stable, secure, and enduring life. Thus theology offers eternal life and unchanging laws while philosophy offers reason and static Being. But for Heidegger these offerings distort the nature of reality, self, and ultimately Being in general. Man is thrown into a temporal world of change. It is this idea of time, change, and eventually man's own death that undermines the false notion of stability. Man's being is not a static is. Rather man's being is an ever-changing and temporary becoming. As such man's being is open to endless possibilities. By accepting change and one's own mortality, man is freed from the false securities offered by theology, morality, and philosophy. This freedom then opens man to the countless possibilities that an ever changing world offers. By exercising his freedom to explore these possibilities, man discovers more and more about his own being and thus about Being in general.

 

 

Finally, it important to note that Heidegger never gets around to giving us the answer to Being. His goal was simply to reformulate the way we ask the question and go about seeking the answer. Being will be discovered by man's reflection on his existence. That is, Being will be discovered by man's observations of his relationships to the world around him. However, man must first have an authentic relationship to himself before he can engage the world in a constructive manner. As such, man must accept himself and his own mortality. Then and only then can man truly accept others and truly open himself to the endless possibilities of being.

 

One last point, one must be careful not to confuse Heidegger's project with Sartre's misunderstanding of it. Heidegger is not after a philosophical basis for selfishness. His quest is not humanism nor is his goal to make man his own god. Rather, Heidegger's objective is to free the quest for Being by clearing away all that distorts man's honest inquiry into himself as a being of Being. Most existentialists you meet today in coffee shops and in chat rooms reflect Sartre not Heidegger.

 

Quick Critique

Heidegger does a great deal to bring to our attention the relational nature of knowledge and existence. Likewise, his insistence that the temporal nature of existence be fundamental to our understanding of existence offers a valuable corrective to the abstract and static philosophy of the enlightenment and most "Christian worldviews". Furthermore, his reflection on the way that language formulates our understanding of the world and our relationship to the world is a great contribution. However, in the final analysis, Heidegger's problem is that his project begs the question. While proclaiming that his is an unbiased quest for Being itself, he has unreflectively determined the fundamental nature of Being before the quest ever begins. That is, Heidegger's project begins by precluding the God of Scripture as the source of all being and thus the source of our understanding of being. In turn his fundamental assumption about Being leads him to make fundamental assumptions about man, the world, and the nature of time by which the nature of Being in general will be supposedly discovered. For example, because the God of Scripture is not the Creator and Sustainer of all that is, the world is governed by an ultimate principle change. Likewise, because time is not created, it is not the finite expression and progressive revelation of God's undivided and eternal plan given to man. Instead, it is the innate condition of randomness, change and impermanence. Furthermore, man is not God's image in God's world under obligation to His Creator. Man is not fallen. As such, under Heidegger's system all moral assessment of man's moods and his orientation towards others are arbitrary. In fact, given Heidegger's basic assumptions and his allegiance to open-ended contingency, Heidegger can't explain how there is anything remotely resembling Being, beings, method of discovery, or a meaningful description of "authentic life". In Heidegger's world of open change the knower and the known are lost.

 

In the end, Heidegger's project fails. It unwittingly assumes the very nature of Being that he claims to seek. In turn, his assumptions falsify the very nature of the reality upon which his investigation depends. The result is that Heidegger's atheos worldview leads to the unsupportable nature of his claims and to the ultimate deconstruction of his system.

 

Derrida

Derrida' project is an attempt to turn philosophy in on itself by exposing its incompatible metaphysical claims and then setting these claims against one another. The purpose of this exercise is to free philosophy from its untenable metaphysical restrictions and thus open thought and life to endless possibilities. His then is a project of never ending deconstruction, reconstruction, and deconstruction.

 

Derrida's begins his project of deconstruction with an examination of time. Because Derrida assumes a world governed by an ultimate principle of chance, his view of time is not thought of in terms of both the continuity (stability) and the mutability (successive nature) of finite being. Rather, change is absolute and thus replaces the continuity of being with an idea of non-being. Time then becomes the constant play between what is no longer (i.e. non-being as the past) and the not yet (i.e. non-being as the future). The result is that Derrida shows that the philosophical notion of being as it has been held by philosophy since the time of Plato is an a-temporal notion. Being cannot share in either the past or the future since these denote what is not and thus stand in direct contradiction to what is. Present (now) and presence (is) must remain eternal and static. Derrida's point is that this temporal definition of being as presence (as that which is present, static, and stable) falsifies metaphysics at its very basis. Instead, because reality is governed by an ultimate principle of chance, metaphysics is in essence the study of becoming not being.

 

Furthermore Derrida maintains that this principle of becoming not only concerns the nature of reality it also concerns man's knowledge of and communication about that reality. First, Man's thoughts about a subject are always a representation of that subject. They are not the thing itself. Therefore, man's thoughts always bear the nature of a sign. Because man and world are randomly changing this sign always signifies something that is past or already changed. As such the sign relegates man's thought to what was and never to what is. Thus it is time and change that falsify man's understanding and keep him from ever achieving stable and certain truth. Second, man's ability to communicate about reality also falls prey to this basic principle of becoming. That is, language at its most basic level assumes the distinction between a stable sign and the thing signified. Once again, the contingent nature of reality means that a sign always signifies something that is past or already changed. The result is that the sign itself is destabilized. With the changing of time comes the loss of the context or situation to which the sign referred. Thus the relationship between sign and signified is lost. However, at the same time, the sign is thus freed from its original context and is opened to endless other contexts and possible meanings. This openness of thought and language directly reflects the openness of reality. With all stability lost to change, knowledge does not seek static being or universal truths as its basis. There are none. Rather, knowledge like the sign is based upon endless new contexts, each new context representing a new and impermanent possibility of meaning. This is what Derrida means when he describes knowledge as difference. What we call "cat" is known not by some abstract formal concept of catness. Rather it is known in terms of its difference to other terms/things. Thus, "cat" on a boat in the 1700's meant mouser while "cat" in Mrs. Jones' pallor means Socks the family pet. Each context presents different objects and situations by which to compare, distinguish, and define "cat". In turn, each context opens another possible meaning of "cat". The loss of the particular context results in the loss of the meaning which that context provided. This loss however, frees one to new possibilities of meaning in new contexts. As such, meaning is not so much a matter of truth in the conventional sense of the term as much as it is a matter of temporary relevance. The same can be said for language as a text. Once continuity is replaced by ultimate change, the context in which a text was written and to which a text originally spoke are lost. Thus a modern evangelical Christian living in Detroit cannot possibly share the particulars to which Isaiah's text was explicitly addressed. However, his own unique context opens for him new and exiting possibilities of meaning as the signs of the text take on new referential relations. Now for Derrida this does not mean that we can not read a text as a historical document in terms of a reconstruction of past situations. Instead, what it means is that the relevance or meaning of that text has changed with the changing history.

 

In the end Derrida's project seeks to deconstruct all illusions of fixed metaphysical verities and all false notions of stable meaning. However, according to Derrida deconstruction is not a nihilistic project. That is, deconstruction is not the goal of Derrida's project but only its first step. Once philosophy, thought, and language have been freed from their old confines, they are now open to endless new possibilities of meaning and relevance. These new meanings though do not replace the old deconstructed meanings in the sense that they are now the fixed, accepted, standards. Rather they too bear the impermanence of all reality. As such, they too must undergo deconstruction to allow for yet other possibilities as time and situations change.

 

Let us review:

• Change over time replaces stability with flux. Reality then is defined in terms of becoming not fixed being
• The fundamental nature of reality implicates man's thought and language in the ongoing process of becoming. Because man and world are randomly changing his thoughts and words always refer to something that is past or already changed.
• The result is that thought and language are denied any stable tie to reality. This loss of fixed meaning and a stable text opens understanding and language to new contexts and thus new possibilities of meaning.
• Deconstruction is an attempt to break down all illusions of fixed metaphysical verities and all false notions of stable meaning in order to allow for an endless play between different contexts, which in turn yields endless possibilities of temporary meaning.

 

 

 

Critique

Though Derrida can be difficult to read, his concepts will not be that hard for a Van Tilian to grasp. In many ways Derrida's project is simply a parody of what Van Til sought to do faithfully and in full. That is, Derrida will set the notion of autonomous particularity over against the notion of autonomous unity in order to demonstrate their mutual impossibility. This is Derrida's method of deconstruction. However, Derrida does not wish to abandon either of the two conflicting principles of metaphysics. Rather, he simply wishes to show that neither can reign supreme to the exclusion of the other. Thus for Derrida deconstruction always occurs within metaphysics, one principle at a time, while leaving the system itself in tact. The reason is that for Derrida reality lies between these two formal poles. Reality then is the play between stable being and non-being over time. Nothing is fixed or permanent. Rather everything is in a process of coming to be, change, and death (coming not to be). In other words the two poles of being and non-being serve as a frame that defines reality as becoming. Of course Van Til would insist that Derrida take His project to its final conclusion. Van Til would absolutely agree with the futility of philosophy's attempt to explain reality in terms of either an autonomous principle of one or an autonomous principle of many. However, Van Til does not allow the unbeliever then to maintain those two defunct principles out of necessity as Derrida must do. If the unity of creation is to be abandoned then we cannot allow for a unified thinker or unified rules of language. We can't even allow for a unified principle of becoming, reason, or deconstruction which Derrida's project must assume to maintain it own intelligibility and ongoing relevance. In other words Derrida can not claim to deconstruct metaphysics while at the same time maintaining those metaphysical principles that he needs to get on with his work. Derrida cannot insist that every picture of reality that metaphysics has provided is falsified by change except the picture of reality that Deconstruction provides. Now Derrida is aware of this dilemma. However, his response seems to be more pragmatic than philosophical. Derrida simply says that to carry deconstruction to its final conclusion, that is, to deconstruct metaphysics utterly, would be nihilistic and would leave philosophy utterly bankrupt and void. BUT THAT IS EXACTLY VAN TIL'S POINT. The false notions of autonomy render all reality, thought, and language utterly and completely unintelligible. Deny God and philosophy IS A VOID.

 

On the other hand, acknowledge the God of Scripture and we are able to give an account of all reality, thought, and communication. For example, as Christian we hold that all human communication (be it thought, gesture, speech, writing, or art) is based on God's sovereign creation and government of creation. That is we maintain that God created and governs both facts and law. Thus communication is not grounded in chaos or non-being but rather in the actuality of particularity and the actuality of the coherence of these particulars. The actuality of particularity necessitates communication between particulars (we are not all the same). The coherence of particulars insures that communication across time and place can and does occur because all particulars originate in God plan (thus we are not ultimately alien to one another).

 

In the end, Deconstruction is based on atheos assumptions about God, the world, and man. These assumptions, like all atheos assumptions, deconstruct into ultimate and final unintelligibility. Thus remember, an open ended view of language, text, and meaning is always the result of an open ended chance driven view of factuality. An open ended factuality is always the result of an open ended or indeterminate view of god (i.e. a god that is either a formal concept or an unknowable infinite other).

 

Wittgenstein

 

Over all, Wittgenstein sought to demonstrate the relationship of language and the world. His thoughts on the matter can be roughly divided into two periods, commonly referred to as early and late Wittgenstein. His book Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus represents his early period while his book Philosophical Investigations represents his later period. Incidentally the Blue and Brown Books represent a transitional phase between the early and later period.

 

In Wittgenstein's early period he sought to explain language in terms of formal logic. As such his early period reflects his endeavor to develop an absolute logical language that could state everything with exact precision. In his later period Wittgenstein sought to explain language not in terms of a formal abstract logic but in terms of its place and function in everyday life. In other words, Wittgenstein's early period reflects a move to the formal, abstract, and general while his later period is a move to the concrete, situational, and particular.

 

Early Wittgenstein

Behind Wittgenstein's philosophy (both early and late) is an assumption that reality is governed by an ultimate principle of chance. This fundamental assumption then is the basis for every proposition in the Tractatus. Thus the world is all there is. There is nothing beyond or behind it that serves as the foundation for its existence or that is necessary for understanding, or that gives it any meaning. The world is simply a collection of objects, which fit together like links in a chain to form states of affairs. At the same time man is finite and therefore his mind is unable to grasp absolutes such as those put forward by metaphysics, theology or ethics. As such, man's understanding of reality shares the world's imminent nature. That is, his understanding is limited to considerations of the immediate. To move beyond what is, is to move into the realm of transcendental fiction. For Wittgenstein then, the purpose of philosophy is to clear away all metaphysical distortions and to clarify the issues with which philosophy deals.

 

Thus, the purpose of the Tractatus is to set a limit on what can be meaningfully expressed by language and thus ultimately thought. Its major points are as follows:

 

·      The world is all there is (no metaphysics or theology rest behind or beneath it)

·      Man's thoughts represent the world to him (man's thoughts provide a picture of the world in terms of which he understands his world)

·      Man's thoughts are expressed in language

·      The analysis of language reveals the formal logic basic to all language and thought

·      Logic then sets the limits to what constitutes a meaningful statement and thus a meaningful picture of reality

·      What can be thought can be said. That is, since absolutes cannot be thought by finite minds, all metaphysical and ethical statements are meaningless and tell us nothing about the world. Therefore, they are excluded from any discussion about the world or existence.

·      About which we cannot speak, we must remain silent. In other words, since all metaphysical, theological, ethical, and aesthetic matters lay outside the ability of logic, language, and thought, all that gives explanation, value, and purpose to life is excluded from philosophy. Philosophy cannot say anything meaningful about them and therefore it must avoid speaking of them.

·      What language does not say it shows. Thus while it is beyond the ability of finite language to speak meaningfully about transcendental matters, language nonetheless points to or shows their necessity by requiring them. Wittgenstein is well aware that even the Tractatus must make metaphysical assumptions. Thus there are three ways that Wittgenstein's early work can be taken: (a) By setting the limits of meaningful language, Wittgenstein precludes the possibility of transcendentals altogether. (b) By exposing the limits of logic, language, and thought, Wittgenstein severely restricts the role and the importance of philosophy. Philosophy may clarify discussions about empirical reality but it cannot answer the truly important questions about life and world. For that man must look elsewhere. Thus, philosophy's limitation is its value. The purpose of philosophy then is to lead us beyond philosophy, beyond the ability of human thought, to the transcendental. In other words, philosophy is to be used and then abandoned. As such, the Tractatus is, as Wittgenstein maintained, truly an ethical treaty. (c) By exposing the limits of language as it is defined by a contingent worldview, Wittgenstein deconstructs this worldview by exposing its inability to address real concerns or to avoid the very thing (metaphysics) it purports to refute. My view is that his purpose is (b).

 

 

Please note: a great deal of the Tratus deals with symbolic logic or formal language as well as the essential nature of propositions. For example, a proposition is a statement of fact. A fact is not a thing in the world but rather is a complex of formal names arranged according to a formal structure indicative of all propositions. A proposition is not dependent on reality for its truth nor does it refer to anything specific in reality. It is a logical statement and not a descriptive statement. As such it bears the nature of a tautology (P v ~P) and thus tells us nothing about reality but rather sets the limits of what can be. The correlation between proposition and the world and thus the basis for language's ability to speak accurately about the world is established by the assumption that both language and world share the same basic structure. This structure cannot be stated nor can it be proven. Rather it can only be demonstrated by its necessity for language's relevance. While these matters lie beyond the scope of our discussion, I want you to be aware that they are there and that they play a large role in the thoughts that have been summarized above.

 

Critique

Over all the best response to the Tractatus is its own admitted failure. While denying a place to metaphysics in any meaningful discussion of philosophy, it must constantly make metaphysical claims in order to get on with its own project. Thus, the Tractatus asserts that the world is, that logic is, that logic and the world bear stable structures, and that these structures cohere. Furthermore, it does no good to simply say that metaphysical principles lie beyond the scope of the actual world and thus can only be shown by language when in fact logic, language, and thought all require these principles to operate in every day experience. For example, the continuity and rationality required by logic are required for logic's function in the actual world. Thus, we can't confine the transcendental to the realm of the mystical beyond when it is constantly encountered in and necessary for everyday existence. Bottom line: the Tractatus must assume the very basis it seeks to deny.

 

More interesting are the Tractatus's claims about the nature of language. The Tractatus maintains that language must be either propositional or empirical. That is, language can only state that something is the case (i.e. describe a situation in the world, "The ball is red"; "It is raining") or make logical statements that have no reference to anything in the actual world. In doing so the Tractatus presents a picture of language that leaves the majority of how language is used unaccounted for. For example, "Bring me the pencil" is neither a logical claim about what must be nor is it a statement about something that exists in reality. Nonetheless it is not a meaningless sentence nor is it one that is void of meaningful information about the world (it conveys the fact that I want a particular pencil and that I want you to bring it to me). Thus eventually you will need to address the claims made by a Proposition theory of language as well as the Verification theory of meaning, the Truth Condition theory of meaning, Logical Positism, and Logical Atomism- all of which grew up out of Wittgenstein's early work. Unfortunately, such lies beyond the scope of this paper and thus must remain shown and not said.

 

Late Wittgenstein

One day while teaching school in Vienna, a friend of Wittgenstein shot him the Italian equivalent of a bird and asked, "what's the logical form of this?". Wittgenstein realized that the Tractatus had failed to account for much meaningful communication. And so began the next phase of Wittgenstein's thought. Thus while the Tractatus espoused the idea that behind all language there is an ultimate or underlying formal logical structure, which always functions the same way everywhere regardless of the situation, Wittgenstein's later thought sees language not as a single unified system but rather as a varied complex of somewhat related activities. In other words, there is no single thing called language that shares a formal structure or mode of operation regardless of where or how it is employed. Instead, the very nature of language and meaning are directly tied to the real life surroundings in which they occur. For example, Wittgenstein came to realize that his earlier quest for exactness of expression failed to recognize that the meaning of exactness is relative to the particular type of activity at hand. In other words, what counts as exact or inexact is not based on some universal norm of exactitude but rather is determined by the demands of a particular activity. The Tractatus failed because it assumed a language of uniform stable meanings. Instead what Wittgenstein came to see is that language and meaning depend deeply upon the situations in which they occur. Context then, not a formal system of logic, determines both the nature of language as well as the nature of the meaning it discloses. In short, the move from early to late Wittgenstein is a move from language as abstract and formal logic to language in terms of its particular and concrete uses in everyday life. Philosophy's job then is no longer to expunge a statement of all its vagaries in order to arrive at the pure logical form that lies behind it. Rather, philosophy's job is to keep the ordinary occurrence of language the focus of attention. What language is, is always before us. It is not behind or above or distinct from our conversations. IT IS OUR CONVERSATIONS.

 

Wittgenstein's later thoughts then have two fundamental implications for our understanding of language.

 

 

First context determines the nature of language (Language as a game):

By locating language in the actualities of life, Wittgenstein realized that language would share life's fluctuating and diverse nature. Language is not everywhere the same. Thus Wittgenstein observed that life is full of various activities, each of which has its own expectations and behaviors. Each activity can be compared to a game. The expectations of the activity are like the objectives of a game while the accepted behaviors are like the rules of play. Thus, one expresses excitement over a ninth inning homerun differently than one expresses excitement over meeting a foreign dignitary. At the same time, language is not something that functions outside of these activities and irrespective of them. Rather language is itself a part of the particular activity. Thus, bowing and saying "your lordship" are equally part of the activity of receiving a dignitary. Yelling "ooh yea baby" and slapping him a high-five are not. As such the particular activity determines the way language is used and the significance of its terms. Language then is one of the key ways that we make specific moves in a specific activity. To understand language then requires an understanding of the particular activity (or game) in which it occurs. Thus far from being a stable fixed entity that is context neutral, language is a central part of the specific game or activity in which it occurs. In turn, language bears the fundamental nature of a game (Thus the language game). That is language is governed by specific rules or socially accepted conventions that direct its use within a specific setting. To speak meaningfully is to speak by the rules. On the other hand, to ignore the rules is to stop playing the particular game with the result that one is no longer understood. However, please note, for Wittgenstein the rules or grammar of any given language game are not to be conceived of as abstract laws that exist over and above language. Rather, they are customs of generally accepted behavior, set by shared expectations, and which have come into existence over time by practice. Bottom line: to speak of language as a game is simply to point out that:

• Language is an activity and not an entity. There is no formal system of language that exists somewhere out there in logical space prior to speaking or writing.
• The activity of language is part of the greater social activity in which it occurs. Language then is not context neutral. Rather it is context determined.
• The socially established norms and expectations of a given activity determine the rules or social norms for how language is used and understood in that particular context

 

In Wittgenstein's own words,

"Here the term language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life." (PI #23)

 

Wittgenstein then goes on to include several examples of different types language games. These include: reporting an event, speculating about an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, making up a story, reading it, playacting, singing, guessing riddles, making a joke, translating, asking, thanking, greeting, praying, and so on. In each case, the type of activity or setting in which language is employed determines how it is used and how it is received. Thus deception and playing on words are an essential part of what makes a joke or a riddle delightful. In court these same delights are called purgery and will get you five to ten. Language is a part of the life setting in which it occurs. To understand language then requires an understanding of the particular activity or game in which it is being used.

 

Second context determines the nature of disclosure (meaning as use):

The sift from language as a fixed universal to language as an activity amid other activities also brought about a shift in the understanding of the exact nature of language's disclosure. A language grounded in the particulars of life could no longer serve to express abstract timeless truths and placeless logical entities. In the same way, meaning became less and less about brute references and more and more about their particular relationship to a specific setting. In other words, Wittgenstein came to understand that the meaning of a word is not some formal definition or logical concept nor is it merely the word's association with an object or thing in the world. Rather, a word derives its meaning from the way it is used. Consider: a good man, a good shot, good for nothing. There is not a single fixed meaning expressed by these various uses of the concept good. Instead, their meaning is derived from the particular situation in which they are employed. Thus, meaning becomes a matter of the way a term is used in a particular context. To put it another way, the meaning of a term is its use in a particular setting. Change the setting and the meaning of the word changes. In the end, Wittgenstein's later thought is characterized by the idea that both language and the meaning it discloses are dependant on the social activity (or game) in which they occur.

 

Critique

As we begin our critique of Wittgenstein's later thought, it will be vital for us to remember the generally held notions of language at the time and with which his philosophy contended. In general the accepted views of language fell into three basic camps. The first view was the more traditional view of language. It held that that the meaning of a word was the object or thing in reality to which it pointed. The second view held that meaning was a logical form or concept (Wittgenstein's own earlier view). The third view attempted to locate meaning in the mental processes of the mind. Ironically, each of these views served to cut language off from the world in which it was used. For example, the traditional view, failed to account for any but a demonstrative type of language. At the same time, it had to assume that the reference associated with a word is static and context neutral. If a word's reference alters or interacts with its setting there will be no way to maintain a stability of meaning from place to place or from time to time. Thus what language refers to is an abstract notion of a thing and not to a particular object in a particular setting. Likewise, the formal view presented a language that said nothing about reality but only stated the logical possibilities of what could be meaningfully expressed. The psychological view cut language off from the world and its social context by burying it deep inside the mental processes of the mind. Each of these views then left language utterly diminished and completely detached for the life settings in which it was actually employed. In light of its surroundings then, Wittgenstein's later work is not a radical skepticism. Instead it represents a corrective, a voyage, as it were, back to earth, back to the concrete everyday situations of life in which language is actually used.

 

That said, there are two ways that Wittgenstein's later ideas have been taken. The first concerns the notion of meaning as use. It holds that the meaning of language is the response or behavior it elicits from the hearer. As such, language is wholly cut off from any reference to the outside world. Thus, an act of speaking (making a move in the game) does not produce meaning in the traditional sense of the word. It does not tell us any thing about the world. It simply prompts the next player to make a move in the game. However, this view fails to account for a great deal of the way language actually is used in everyday life. For example, "The rate of gravity is 9.8 meters per second" does not elicit any behavior from its hearer. Its use is simply to impart something true about the outside world. Deny language any reference to the outside world and the information imparting game becomes meaningless. Yet this sort of language game is engaged in every day. Consider the difference between the following examples and the one just given above: "Please believe me when I tell you that the rate of gravity is 9.8 meters per second" or "Go test the findings that the rate of gravity is 9.8 meters per second". These sentences serve a different use and seek a different end than that of the one above. They both want the hearer to do something. However, even the behavior they elicit is meaningful or rightfully expected only because of the information each sentence imparts about the world. Thus apart from language's ability to communicate about existence, the majority if not all language games become unintelligible.

 

There are several other problems that arise when meaning as use is defined exclusively in terms of the behavior it elicits. First, an expression' meaning cannot be wholly accounted for by its role in a particular language game. Otherwise, words would be restricted to particular games. It is precisely because use does not exhaust meaning that words can be used in much the same way from game to game. Second, if meaning is defined wholly in terms of use, how do we account for new or novel meanings? The new meaning or novel use of a word would be defined by the norms of expected use already in place. Therefore, the new meaning would either be reinterpreted according to the conventional meaning or it would be unintelligible. Finally, experience demonstrates that rules or moves in a game are not the same as meaning nor do they generate meaning. Otherwise, we would expect to find other rule-based games generating meaningful communication. However, moving the black pawn to C- 5 in a chess game does not result in anything like the meaning produced by the linguistic move of one person saying to another, "I love you". The point is that while use is a vital part of everyday speech, it is not the whole of everyday speech. If we deny language any referential relation to the outside world, use becomes mere behaviorism. In turn, meaning is reduced to simply what I want another person to do in response to my statement. The result is that the Use as Behavior model fails to make the majority of our linguistic experience intelligible. Thus while the behaviorist's model can explain the fact that my yelling, "look out" is used to get you to duck. It cannot begin to demonstrate why you should duck in response to what I have said. There is no connection between the utterance "look out" and the ball flying at your head. However, "Look out" is meaningful precisely because it has reference to an objective reality, an objective reality, which is about to dot you on your dome.

 

The second way that Wittgenstein's ideas have been taken concerns the notion of language as a game. Here the focus is on the role of context for all aspects of language, be it behavior or disclosure. Life is not a set of abstract occurrences that stand in isolation from one another. Instead life is web of interconnected shared experiences. In the same way, the language that is used to speak about these various activities will reflect their nature. Such a language then cannot be one of pure logic, which remains disjoined from the diversity of concrete situations. Rather, it must be a language that is able to speak specifically about the particular situation. The diversity of life requires a diverse and supple language.

 

That said, the point of contention then becomes the nature of this diversity. How we understand the diverse relations in life will determine how we understand the plasticity of language. Ones view of language then always reflects one's view of metaphysics. Language is always a metaphysical issue. For example, if the diversity of life is governed by an ultimate principle of chance then there will be no stable context, reference, or practice upon which to base language. As such, there will be no basis upon which to ground a stable coherent meaning. In other words, an ever-changing and open-ended reality can offer no more than a language of ever-changing and open-ended meaning.

 

It is on the basis of such a picture of reality that people will often try to construe the notion of language games as hermetically sealed speech communities that have no relevance beyond their own boundaries. For example, while giving a lecture on hermeneutics and the necessity of God for all interpretation, I had a professor challenge my position by claiming that all my talk about God was merely a part of a religious language game and therefore said nothing of the world. "That is just the way you talk about reality". This is known as the linguistic turn. Because the world is made of isolated random particulars, relations and connections between things are not actual. Instead, they are the product of the relations and connections that our language provides. In other words, the world is like a collection of random dots on a paper. The way we choose to talk about those dots is like the crayon that connects the dots into any number of pictures, none of which are right or true. Metaphysics then is not a matter of reality but only a matter of how we talk about reality. The result is that each language game makes its own connections and paints its own fictitious picture of the world, which has no bearing on way things really are.

 

Of course this view has some serious problems to overcome. First, Wittgenstein himself understood that any meaningful use of language required certain shared forms of life. That is, for language to be taught from generation to generation and for it to function from person to person there must be such a thing as shared humanity, shared history, specific and distinguishable shared activities (or games), and shared rules or social conventions that govern those games. However, an ever-changing and open-ended reality cannot provide the necessary coherence required for any such shared forms of life. In a universe governed by random chance, there is no shared humanity, there are no shared conventions, there are no stable rules of speech or behavior, and, as Derrida is apt to point out, there is no such thing as an identifiable shared context. The linguistic turn and the resulting relativism of meaning are unintelligible on their own basis. If meaning is relative to each particular language game, then there are no language games and no language game players. You can't claim the stability of one while denying stability to the other.

 

However, if we return the idea of language and life settings to their proper theocentric basis what we find is a sovereignly governed reality in which the particularity of a context is not given over to random and unknowable change. Instead, we have a world in which both the actuality of particulars and the actuality of the coherence of particulars are maintained. This in turn, provides the context necessary for a language that is able to adapt to the specific demands of a situation yet with out becoming wholly open or relative in its meaning. The reason being is that while the particular relations of a situation are unique they are not ultimately alien to the particulars of any other situation. Instead, every fact and every circumstance stands in an ultimate relation to God and to God's plan. Therefore every particular and every circumstance stands in a derivative relation to every other part of God's plan.

 

 

 

 

                                    F                    F

 

In other words, the move from one setting (or game) to another is not a move between two disjoined and unrelated meanings. Rather, because the ultimate identity of a particular is not contingent upon or lost to the specific relations in which it enters, language is able to speak to the distinctives of a situation in such a way that its meaning is relevant to other contexts (or games). The relational nature of creation means the related nature of meaning.

 

Thus far from reducing language to situational relativism, the relational nature of language is based on and give expression to the actuality of relations between things in creation. As such, it is mandatory for the disclosure of reality. The result is a language that is located in the sovereignly governed contexts of everyday life and is able to speak to the distinct particulars of these situations without reducing meaning to relativism. Context then cannot be ignored nor can it be seen as contingent and thus ultimate to meaning. Only on a theocentric basis do we find the conditions necessary for a language that is able to speak about the unique relations of life.

 

By placing language in its proper theocentric context, its true nature begins to emerge. Thus it might be beneficial to take a moment to present a brief outline of the theocentric model of language. In turn, this model will enable us to recover the notion of use and its proper function within disclosure. First the Model:

 

 

A] The Aspects of Language (language as pre-text):

 

1)    Man's language is reflective and derivative of God's language. At creation we hear God using language to call forth creation (reference) according to His plan (sense). Thus, at once language is set within the context of both world and worldview. That is, language is a matter of both reference and the meaning of reference. Language then is able to speak about (sense) existence (reference).

 

2)    In language neither sense nor reference is more basic or fundamental than the other. Sense is mediated through reference (sense is the sense of a reference. It is an understanding of a thing's relation to God's plan). Likewise, reference is mediated through sense (there are no brute or autonomous facts. Rather everything stands in relation to God and God's plan. Thus to know a thing is to know it in terms of its significance, relations, and sense within God's plan). At every point then sense and reference must stand together in an analytic relation. Anything less would be to present a false view of reality.

 

3)    This dual aspect of language (sense/reference) means that language is fundamentally hermeneutical. That is, language is a tool of interpretation. Language does not create meaning. Rather language occurs within a meaningful environment. As such, the nature and function of language are based upon man's obligation to speak correctly (sense) about God and God's world (reference).

 

B] The Aspects of Text (language as expression):

 

1)    Language enters reality as a text and it is as a text that it is acquired and studied. The Aspects of Text then are the factors and relations that govern language employed as expression. They are syntax, semantics, and use.

 

2)    Because each Aspect of the Text is linguistic, each presupposes the Aspects of Language (sense and reference). For example, syntax or the way that words are related to form the meaning of a sentence, is a matter of both sense and reference. The syntactical arrangement, "John hit the ball" refers to a very different situation in reality than "The ball hit John". Syntax is shaped by its reference. At the same time, the syntactical arrangement, "Your sins are redeemed in Christ" and "In Christ, your sins are redeemed" express the same notion. However, the syntactical relationship of each sentence underscores a difference of emphasis and significance. The syntactical arrangements then of each sentence expresses a different interpretation or sense of the particular subject matter at hand. The point here is that syntax is a matter of both sense and reference. It is neither a matter of bare reporting and thus determined solely by its reference nor is it wholly a matter of convention and thus determined simply by the sense or meaning that one wishes to express.

 

Likewise, semantics or the meaning of a word cannot be reduced to either bare reference or mere sense. Rather, the analytical relation of both sense and reference determines the meaning of a word. Thus, the meaning of "Plato" is not simply the reference or person to which it points. Rather, its meaning carries with it a whole host of associations. For example, "Plato" means philosopher, early Greek, not to mention the particular aspects of his thought that this word comes to represent. The meaning of "Plato" then is as much a matter of the sense it carries as it is of reference to which it points. In the same way, the meaning of the word "beautiful" is not wholly a matter of sense devoid of any concrete reference. If such were the case, the word would be a blank abstract with no concrete application to things in the world (however ambiguous that application might be at times). This fact can be further demonstrated by a word's the dependence on syntax for its meaning. A sentence is not simple a list of references. Rather, the relationship in which a word is placed to other words will refine its meaning. Such would not be the case if the meaning of a word were simply a bare reference to some objective fact in the world. Meaning is as much a matter of the way words and things relate, as it is a matter of the things to which the words refer. The point here is that semantics like syntax is a matter of both sense and reference.

 

Finally, use or the function of a word and the unique way it is employed from situation to situation is likewise a matter of both sense and reference. Consider the following: "A good man", "A good shot", "Good for nothing". In each case the meaning of the word, "good" is refined by its relationship to the various contexts in which it is used. Use then is a matter of the sense in which the context requires the word to be taken. On the other hand, use requires a stability of basic meaning that transcends and thus is applicable to these various contexts. Behind the word, "good" is the basic notion of hitting the mark. A man is good because he conforms to an ethical mark. A shot is good because it hits its competitive mark. Something is good for nothing because it fails to reach any of its required marks. The particular mark then of a given situation is the shared objective reference upon which the intelligibility of the word good depends. At the same time, the transcendence of the notion of a mark precludes defining the meaning of the word "good" completely in terms of any one of its particular contexts or senses. Again, the point is that use, like semantics and syntax, is a matter of both sense and reference.

 

3)    Because the Aspects of Text (semantics, syntax, and use) presupposes the Aspects of Language (sense and reference). Each aspect, together with the relations it establishes, are set within the contexts of world and worldview. As such, each Aspect of the Text is fundamentally hermeneutical. That is semantics, syntax, and use all employ language to tell us something (sense) about existence (reference). In turn no one of these Aspect of the Text can be cut off from the world or its meaningfulness and remain intelligible.

 

Meaning as Use

The return of life and language to their theocentric moorings provides for an understanding of the use of language that does not deny language's referential aspect and so does not reduce meaning to mere behaviorism. Instead, use is one of the main ways by which reference and significance are expressed. The fact that language enters existence as a text, indicates that speech is fundamentally an act that occurs within the operations of every day life and which serves any number of various functions. As such, the aspect of use must be accounted for in the nature of meaning. How we employ language and the situation in which we employ it will play a large part in determining meaning. That said, we must be careful to distinguish our use or application of meaning from meaning itself. Use is not sense or reference nor is it their origin. Rather, use presupposes and is determined by these two fundamental Aspects of Language. To a child a tomato may look like a ball. But we say to the child "we don't throw tomatoes. We eat them." The child thus learns the significance of a particular reference through its use. However we cannot imagine a society that eats supper balls and bounces tomatoes. The particular attributes of each reference determine their potential significance and thus their potential use. So it is with language. While language is conventional, it is not wholly open nor is it entirely use. Instead behind the use of language is concrete reference and significance. The point here is that meaning is used (not use is meaning). That is, use is the history of how a linguistic community has understood and thus spoken about the sense of a reference. Use then presupposes sense and reference as well as the relational nature of creation. In other words, use is useful precisely because it is moored to meaning.

At the same time, because language occurs in a relational universe meaning is able to adapt to several different uses thus reflecting the various relations that occur between particulars within existence. To assume a context neutral meaning is to assume a static reality of disjoined and unrelated parts. On the other hand, to assume a meaning wholly defined by its setting is to assume a random and ever-changing factuality with no stability of particulars from context to context. Instead, the relational nature of a sovereignly governed and coherent creation means that distinct particulars can enter countless relations each of which serves to reveal a specific aspect of that particular. A theocentric language then is able to reflect the nuances of meaning that arise from these various situations through its particular use. In the end, by locating language in the metaphysical dynamic of a meaningful creation where sense and reference are inseparable, use comes to represent language's ability to express the various shades of meaning that result from the various relations in which a subject may enter. Thus attention to a theocentric-grounded idea of use keeps us from the notion of an abstract and context free meaning while avoiding the relativism of a wholly open universe.

 

Notice then:

• Language is fundamentally sense and reference
• A text (or a speech act) is language employed to speak about existence
• The aspects of a text are those relations that shape language into a particular expression. They are syntax, semantics, and use.
• Because each aspect of the text is linguistic, each presupposes the aspects of language (sense and reference). Therefore, each enables the text to tell us something (sense) about reality (reference).
• The result is that Meaning is textual. That is meaning is communicated by the selections, relations, patterns, and arrangements of the text. As such, meaning is not sought beyond or beneath the text. The text is what communicates meaning.
• At the same time the text is able to speak about reality. The text is not cut off from reality or the intentions of the author.
• Finally, the move from experience to text and from text to experience a hermeneutical move via the same hermeneutical method.

 

In conclusion let me say I hope this helps. Some of it will be immediately clear while some of it will require thought and a growing into. Other parts, I fear, will remain hopelessly lost due to my own failure as a guide. My hope is that, in time, the sign posts left here by a fellow traveler may suggest to you the way out of the maze called fallen thought.

 

Grace and Peace,

 

Your friend Charlie